Key Principles You Can Use

• A temporary or ad‑hoc hearing officer cannot be neutral if their future employment depends on pleasing the government agency hiring them.
• The Court held that this creates an “unacceptable risk of bias” because the officer has a pecuniary interest in ruling for the agency.

How it applies to your facts

• Windsor hires the hearing officer.
• Windsor pays the hearing officer.
• Windsor decides whether to hire them again.
• Windsor is also the prosecuting party.

That is the exact configuration Haas prohibits.

• Shelter Contract
  The Town pays the shelter a fixed monthly amount. If the Town loses, it undermines the justification for the seizure and the contract expenditures.
• Town Attorney + Hearing Officer
  Both are paid by the same entity. Even if they are not direct colleagues, they are financially subordinate to the same employer.
• Outcome Dependence
  A ruling against the Town is a ruling against the hearing officer’s own payor and potential future employer.

This is not about proving actual bias.
It’s about showing structural bias, which is enough under Haas.

 Government Code § 11425.30 — Functional Conflict

This statute bars anyone from serving as a presiding officer if they have acted as an investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the same proceeding.

You’re not arguing that the hearing officer literally prosecuted the case.
You’re arguing that:

• Their financial dependency on the same employer as the prosecutor
• Creates a functional alignment with the prosecuting agency.

California courts have repeatedly emphasized that the appearance of bias is enough to violate due process.

Commingling of Functions — Nightlife Partners

Nightlife Partners v. Beverly Hills reinforces that when prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are intertwined within the same entity, due process is compromised.

Your facts:

• Town Attorney = prosecutor
• Town Hearing Officer = adjudicator
• Both paid by the same Town Council
• Both subordinate to the same Town Manager

5. Rank/Subordination Conflict — Penal Code § 597.1(f)(6)

This statute requires that the hearing officer be independent from the seizing agency.

If the hearing officer is:

• Paid by the Town
• Appointed by the Town
• Professionally subordinate to the Town
• And the Town is the seizing agency

…then independence is impossible.

I object to the current hearing arrangement on the grounds of systemic financial bias and a violation of the Haas v. County of San Bernardino standard. The Town of Windsor is the employer and payor of the prosecuting attorney, the seizing agency (Animal Control), and the Hearing Officer. This creates an unacceptable risk of pecuniary bias because the Hearing Officer’s continued employment and future assignments are financially dependent on the same entity that initiated and seeks to uphold the seizure.

Under Haas, a temporary or ad-hoc hearing officer who relies on the appointing agency for future work has a disqualifying pecuniary interest. Additionally, the Town’s unified control over both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions constitutes impermissible commingling under Nightlife Partners v. Beverly Hills. The arrangement also violates the independence requirement of Penal Code § 597.1(f)(6) and the functional neutrality requirements of Government Code § 11425.30.

For these reasons, I respectfully move to disqualify the Hearing Officer for cause.